Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13921
Authors: Hans Gersbach; Akaki Mamageishvili; Oriol Tejada
Abstract: We analyze the effect of handicaps on turnout. A handicap is a difference in the vote tally between alternatives that strategic voters take aspredetermined when they decide whether to turn out for voting. Handicaps are implicit in many existing democratic procedures. Within a costly voting framework with private values, we show that turnout incentives diminish considerably across the board if handicaps are large, while low handicaps yield more mixed predictions. The results extend beyond the baseline model - e.g. by including uncertainty and behavioral motivations - and can be applied to the optimal design of Assessment Voting. This is a new voting procedure where (i) some randomly-selected citizens vote for one of two alternatives, and the results are published; (ii) the remaining citizens vote or abstain, and (iii) the final outcome is obtained by applying the majority rule to all votes combined. If the size of the first voting group is appropriate, large electorates will choose the majority's preferred alternative with high probability and average participation costs will be moderate or low.
Keywords: turnout; referenda; elections; pivotal voting; private value
JEL Codes: C72; D70; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| large handicaps (J14) | decrease in turnout incentives (D72) |
| handicap increases (J14) | likelihood of voter turnout diminishes (K16) |
| size of the first voting group chosen appropriately (D72) | large electorates will choose majority's preferred alternative (D72) |
| assessment voting framework (C52) | average participation costs remain moderate or low (Z29) |
| handicaps (J14) | underdog effect moderates turnout (D79) |