Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13917
Authors: Helios Herrera; Massimo Morelli; Salvatore Nunnari
Abstract: This paper provides a theory of how war onset and war duration depend on the initial distribution of power when conflict triggers a reallocation of power but the loser is not eliminated. In the model, players take into account not only the expected consequences of war on the current distribution of resources, but also its expected consequences on the future distribution of military and political power. We highlight three main results: the key driver of war, in both the static and the dynamic game, is the mismatch between military and political power; dynamic incentives usually amplify static incentives, leading forward-looking players to be more aggressive; and a war is more likely to last for longer if political power is initially more unbalanced than military power and the politically under-represented player is militarily advantaged.
Keywords: war duration; balance of powers; formal model; international relations; causes of war; dynamic game
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| mismatch between military and political power (D74) | likelihood of war increases (H56) |
| politically underrepresented player militarily advantaged (P26) | likelihood of war increases (H56) |
| initial political power more unbalanced than military power (D74) | likelihood of war increases (H56) |
| mismatch between military and political power (D74) | duration of war increases (H56) |
| politically underrepresented player militarily advantaged (P26) | duration of war increases (H56) |
| initial political power more unbalanced than military power (D74) | duration of war increases (H56) |