Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13898
Authors: Gianmarco Leon Ciliotta; Luis Martinez; Mariella Gonzales
Abstract: We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fi ne for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fi ne leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fi ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fi ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information andlarger long-run eff ects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.
Keywords: voter turnout; voter registration; compulsory voting; informational frictions; external validity; peru
JEL Codes: D72; D78; D83; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| abstention fine increase (H26) | voter turnout increase (K16) |
| abstention fine increase (H26) | blank or invalid votes increase (K16) |
| abstention fine increase (H26) | heterogeneous turnout response (D79) |