Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13878
Authors: Massimo Morelli; Elliott Ash; Matia Vannoni
Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in U.S. states. We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than legislature and governor) were divided.
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Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| divided government (D72) | civil service reform (D73) |
| divided government (divided chambers) (D72) | civil service reform (D73) |
| divided government (divided governor) (D72) | civil service reform (D73) |