Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13854
Authors: Christian C. P. Wolff; Thomas Connelly
Abstract: In this paper we examine the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend policy for Thai publicly listed companies. High family ownership firms have higher dividend payouts than low family ownership firms, which we interpret to mean high family ownership firms follow a more rational dividend policy. This finding is consistent with the prediction that agency conflicts between the managers and shareholders are lower at firms with a controlling shareholder. The evidence is robust through different econometric specifications, robust when the level used to determine the extent of family ownership (family control) is lowered to 10 percent of the outstanding shares, and robust to the inclusion of the ownership wedge as a proxy for the severity of agency conflicts.
Keywords: family ownership; control; payout policy; agency conflicts
JEL Codes: G30; G35
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Family Ownership (high) (G32) | Higher Dividend Payouts (G35) |
| Family Ownership (high) (G32) | Lower Agency Conflicts (G34) |
| Lower Agency Conflicts (G34) | Higher Dividend Payouts (G35) |