Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13845
Authors: Eleonora Patacchini; Marco Battaglini; Edoardo Rainone
Abstract: We present a model of the U.S. Congress in which social connections among Congress members are endogenous and matter for their legislative activity. We propose a novel equilibrium concept for the network formation game that allows for a sharp characterization of equilibrium behavior and that yields a unique prediction under testable conditions. While the equilibrium is characterized by a large number of nonlinear equations, we show that the model can be structurally estimated by an appropriately designed Approximate Bayesian Computationmethod. Estimating the model using data from the 109th to 113th U.S. Congresses, we show that social connections are important for legislators' productivities and we identify some of the key determinants of social centralities in Congress.
Keywords: Social Connections; Legislative Effectiveness; Network Formation
JEL Codes: D71; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| social connections (Z13) | legislative effectiveness (D72) |
| 1% increase in social connectedness (I14) | 0.74% increase in individual effectiveness (C91) |
| party affiliation (D72) | social connections (Z13) |
| interpersonal relations formed prior to elections (D79) | legislative effectiveness (D72) |