Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13763
Authors: Andreas Bernecker; Pierre Boyer; Christina Gathmann
Abstract: This paper shows that electoral incentives matter for the decision to implement novel policies. Our empirical setting is the period prior to and following the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning.
Keywords: policy innovation; electoral incentives; welfare reform; spillovers
JEL Codes: D72; D78; O35; H75; I38
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral Support (K16) | Policy Experimentation (C93) |
| Lame Duck Status (D72) | Policy Experimentation (C93) |
| Electoral Support + Lame Duck Status (K16) | Policy Experimentation (C93) |