Unhedgeable Inflation Risk within Pension Schemes

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13742

Authors: Damiaan Chen; Roel Beetsma; Sweder van Wijnbergen

Abstract: Pension schemes generally aim to protect the purchasing power of their participants, but cannot completely do this when due to market incompleteness inflation risk cannot be fully hedged. Without a market price for inflation risk the value of a pension contract depends on the investor's risk appetite and inflation risk exposure. We develop a valuation framework to deal with two sources of unhedgeable inflation risk: the absence of instruments to hedge general consumer price inflation risk and differences in group-specific consumption bundles from the economy-wide bundle. We find that the absence of financial instruments to hedge inflation risks may reduce lifetime welfare by up to 6% of certainty-equivalent consumption for commonly assumed degrees of risk aversion. Regulators face a dilemma as young (workers) and old participants (retirees) have different capacities to absorb losses from unhedgeable inflation risks and as a consequence have a different risk appetite.

Keywords: unhedgeable inflation risk; welfare loss; incomplete markets; pension contract valuation

JEL Codes: C61; E21; G11; G23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
absence of financial instruments to hedge general consumer price inflation risk (G19)significant reduction in lifetime welfare (D69)
differences in consumption bundles between young workers and retirees (J26)exacerbation of welfare loss associated with unhedgeable inflation risk (D69)
inability to hedge inflation risk (G19)significant disparities in welfare outcomes across age groups (I39)

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