Consumer Myopia in Vehicle Purchases: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13736

Authors: Arthur Van Benthem; Sebastien Houde; Kenneth Gillingham

Abstract: A central question in the analysis of fuel-economy policy is whether consumers are myopic with regards to future fuel costs. We provide the first evidence on consumer valuation of fuel economy from a natural experiment. We examine the short-run equilibrium effects of an exogenous restatement of fuel-economy ratings that affected 1.6 million vehicles. Using the implied changes in willingness-to-pay, we find that consumers act myopically: consumers are indifferent between $1 in discounted fuel costs and 15-38 cents in the vehicle purchase price when discounting at 4%. This myopia persists under a wide range of assumptions.

Keywords: fuel economy; vehicles; myopia; undervaluation; regulation

JEL Codes: D12; H25; L11; L62; L71; Q4


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
significant restatement of fuel economy ratings by Hyundai and Kia (L94)expected future fuel costs (Q47)
expected future fuel costs (Q47)consumer responses to changes in fuel economy ratings (D11)
consumer responses to changes in fuel economy ratings (D11)transaction prices of affected vehicles (R48)
transaction prices of affected vehicles (R48)equilibrium price response (D59)
$1 increase in discounted future fuel costs (Q47)$1.538 increase in vehicle purchase price (R48)
undervaluation of fuel economy (Q51)consumer valuation parameter of approximately 0.015038 (D46)

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