Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13723
Authors: Konstantin Sonin; Georgy Egorov
Abstract: We analyze persuasion in a model, in which each receiver might buy a direct access to the sender's signal or to rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher slant increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or nearly one, but not in-between. The impact of the network density depends on this probability as well.
Keywords: propaganda; networks; bayesian persuasion; percolation
JEL Codes: P16; D85; L82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher slant (Y20) | increased impact on direct receivers (F69) |
| higher slant (Y20) | decreased willingness of agents to subscribe for information (D82) |
| optimal propaganda strategy (D72) | targets peripheral agents (L65) |
| probability of information flow (D89) | effectiveness of propaganda (C92) |
| network structure (D85) | sender's ability to persuade (D72) |
| increased network density (D85) | decreases optimal slant (H21) |