Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13697
Authors: Edoardo Teso; Emanuele Colonnelli; Mounu Prem
Abstract: In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997-2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.
Keywords: patronage; public sector; employment; political connections
JEL Codes: D72; J45; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Political connections (D72) | Employment in public sector organizations (J45) |
| Supporters of the winning party (D72) | Employment in public sector organizations (J45) |
| Political connections (D72) | Hiring of less competent individuals (J79) |
| Less competent supporters (D79) | Employment in public sector organizations (J45) |