Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13621
Authors: Davide Luca; Andrés Rodríguez-Pose
Abstract: A growing amount of research explores how the allocation of regional development monies follows electoral reasons. Yet, the existing literature on distributive politics provides different and contrasting expectations on which geographical areas will be targeted. We focus on proportional representation (PR) systems. While in such settings governments have incentives to target core districts and punish foes’, we suggest that when incumbents attempt to build a state-party image they may broaden the territorial allocation of benefits and even target opposition out-groups. We exploit data on Turkey’s public transport investment for the period 2003-2014 and in-depth interviews to provide results in support of our hypothesis.
Keywords: Public Investment; Transport Infrastructure; Distributive Politics; Politics of Development; Turkey
JEL Codes: D72; H70; O18; O43
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Turkish government’s increasing power (H11) | strategic shift in public investment allocation (H54) |
| strategic shift in public investment allocation (H54) | allocation of transport investments to previously disadvantaged Kurdish provinces after 2009 (H54) |
| Turkish government’s increasing power (H11) | allocation of transport investments to previously disadvantaged Kurdish provinces after 2009 (H54) |
| strategic shift in public investment allocation (H54) | solidification of dominance by ruling party (AKP) (P26) |