Quitting Externalities with Uncertainty about Future Productivity

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1360

Authors: Alison L. Booth; Gylfi Zoega

Abstract: This paper looks at the effect of quitting on the number of workers trained under conditions of uncertainty about future productivity when workers have both firm-specific and industry-specific skills. A new effect is found which works in the opposite direction to the undertraining result of Stevens (1994, 1995): A high quit rate makes investment in training less irreversible in the presence of firing costs and hence also less risky. This effect makes firms start hiring new workers at a lower level of productivity and hire more workers for a given increase in productivity. A rise in the quit rate can now either decrease or increase the number of trained workers.

Keywords: quitting externalities; uncertainty; underinvestment

JEL Codes: E32; J23; J24; J41


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
higher quit rate (J26)increase in number of workers trained (J24)
higher quit rate (J26)reduced irreversibility of training investments (D25)
reduced irreversibility of training investments (D25)increase in number of workers trained (J24)
higher quit rate (J26)hiring new workers at lower productivity levels (J29)
hiring new workers at lower productivity levels (J29)hiring more workers for a given increase in productivity (J24)

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