Marriage Market Equilibrium: Qualifications and Ability

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13590

Authors: Dan Anderberg; Jesper Bagger; Venkataraman Bhaskar; Tanya Wilson

Abstract: We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo- Siow (2006) style model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability.

Keywords: Marriage; Qualifications; Assortative Mating; Latent Ability

JEL Codes: D10; D13; I26; J12


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
ROSLA legislation (K16)Increase in likelihood of obtaining basic qualifications (I24)
Increase in likelihood of obtaining basic qualifications (I24)Altered marriage market qualification distribution (D39)
Altered marriage market qualification distribution (D39)Permanent increase in never-married rates among unqualified individuals (J12)
Low ability (G53)Marriage probabilities for unqualified individuals (J12)
Ability and qualification differences (I24)Marriage gap between unqualified and basic qualifications individuals (J12)
Own ability and qualifications (J24)Spousal qualification gap (J12)

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