Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13587
Authors: Roberto Galbiati; Emeric Henry; Arnaud Philippe; David Abrams
Abstract: In this paper, we show that sentencing norms vary widely even across geographically close units. By examining North Carolina's unique judicial rotation system, we show that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge to local sentencing norms. We document factors that facilitate this convergence and show that sentencing norms are predicted by preferences of the local constituents. We build on these empirical results to analyze theoretically the delegation trade-off faced by a social planner: the judge can learn the local norm, but only at the cost of potential capture.
Keywords: norms; laws; judicial decision making; delegation
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Judicial rotation (K40) | Convergence to local sentencing norms (K14) |
| Convergence to local sentencing norms (K14) | Judges' decisions (K41) |
| Higher crime rates (K42) | Lower average sentences (K40) |
| Judges operating outside their home districts (K40) | Convergence to local sentencing norms (K14) |