Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13562
Authors: Guo Xu; Marianne Bertrand; Robin Burgess
Abstract: Using exogenous variation in social proximity generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be more corrupt and less able to withstand illegitimate political pressure. Despite this, we observe that home officers are more likely to be promoted in the later stages of their careers. To understand this dissonance between performance and promotion we show that incoming Chief Ministers preferentially promote home officers that come from the same home district. Taken together, our results suggest that social proximity hampers bureaucrat performance by facilitating political capture and corruption.
Keywords: Social Proximity; Bureaucrat Performance; Performance and Promotion; Political Economy
JEL Codes: D73; H11; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| home state allocation (H77) | perceptions of corruption (H57) |
| home state allocation (H77) | ability to withstand political pressure (D72) |
| home state allocation (H77) | subjective performance ratings (L25) |
| perceptions of corruption (H57) | bureaucratic performance (D73) |
| ability to withstand political pressure (D72) | bureaucratic performance (D73) |
| home state allocation (H77) | bureaucratic performance (D73) |