Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function?

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13533

Authors: Michelle Sovinsky; Eric Helland

Abstract: Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Many members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms form RJVs to facilitate product collusion. We exploit variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive benefits but not the research synergies of a RJV. Estimates from our RJV participation equation indicate participation is impacted by the policy change. The magnitude is significant with an average drop in the probability of joining of 30%. Our results are consistent with RJVs serving a collusive function.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: L24; L44; K21; O32


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
leniency policy revision (K40)RJV participation (R50)
leniency policy revision (K40)likelihood of collusion (L12)
likelihood of collusion (L12)RJV participation (R50)

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