Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13512
Authors: Nathan Sussman; Al Slivinski
Abstract: We analyze the Parisian taille of the late 13th century - a taxation mechanism used to finance periodic major expenditures by the French Crown, including wars. Our major finding is that this system was remarkably successful along a number of dimensions, in an environment without the administrative structures used by contemporary governments. The taille’s essential features were; an agreement between the king and city government to collect a fixed amount of revenue, and a collection process that made use of information about taxpayers held by their fellow artisans and/or neighbors. We show that it collected considerable sums without social unrest, with high levels of compliance, and administrative costs that were low even by modern standards. We also argue that its success may have lessons for improved tax collection and compliance in contemporary less-developed economies.
Keywords: taxation; evasion; compliance; institutions; fairness; middle ages; paris
JEL Codes: N13; N43; H2; H21; H26
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Agreement between the king and city government to collect a fixed amount of revenue (H71) | High compliance rates among taxpayers (H26) |
| Public revelation of individual tax assessments (H26) | Increased compliance by creating social accountability among taxpayers (H26) |
| Tax burden primarily borne by wealthy elites (H22) | Mitigated civil unrest and contributed to the system's stability (D74) |
| Lack of significant bureaucratic machinery (D73) | Successful collection of taxes (H26) |
| Features of the taille system (local knowledge of taxpayers' circumstances) (H26) | Effective monitoring and compliance (G18) |
| High compliance (L15) | Successful operation of the taille system despite socio-economic challenges (P13) |