Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13462
Authors: Hessel Oosterbeek; Sndor Svg; Bas van der Klaauw
Abstract: We use rich data from the secondary-school match in Amsterdam to nonparametrically decompose school segregation by ethnicity and by household income into five additive sources: i) ability tracking, ii) noise, iii) residential segregation, iv) preference heterogeneity, and v) capacity constraints. Important features of the Amsterdam school district are its diverse population, that students can freely choose any school at their ability level, that school density is high and that private schools are absent. We find that school segregation is mainly driven by ability tracking and students from different groups having different preferences. Residential segregation, capacity constraints and noise play only a minor role. Of the four policies that we analyze, affirmative action in the form of minority quotas reduces segregation the most. This comes, however, at the cost of reducing student welfare.
Keywords: segregation; school match; ability tracking; policy simulations
JEL Codes: I21; I24; I28
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| ability tracking (C99) | school segregation (I24) |
| preference heterogeneity (D11) | school segregation (I24) |
| residential segregation (R23) | school segregation (I24) |
| affirmative action policies (J78) | school segregation (I24) |
| affirmative action policies (J78) | student welfare (I38) |