Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13424
Authors: Rosario Crin; Giovanni Immordino; Salvatore Piccolo
Abstract: Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.
Keywords: crime; enforcement; extradition; fleeing; migration
JEL Codes: K14; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| cost of extradition (H76) | enforcement decisions (K40) |
| enforcement levels (K40) | criminal behavior (K42) |
| criminal behavior (K42) | extradition costs (H76) |
| enforcement levels (K40) | criminals fleeing the country (K42) |
| extradition costs (H76) | coordination on efficient outcome (D70) |