Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13418
Authors: Ramin Baghai; Bo Becker; Stefan Pitschner
Abstract: Credit ratings have been shown to be imperfect and sometimes biased measures of risk. Has this affected their use in unregulated settings? Using textual analysis, we measure the use of credit ratings in investment mandates of fixed income mutual funds, where ratings serve to limit investment in risky assets. We find that this use has steadily increased from high initial levels over the past two decades. Fixed income markets’ extensive and continued reliance on credit ratings either points to a lack of practically useful alternatives, a positive view of ratings by market participants, or inefficient contracting.
Keywords: credit ratings; investment mandates; delegated asset management; financial crisis
JEL Codes: G24; G23; G01
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| time (C41) | reliance on credit ratings (G24) |
| inclusion of credit ratings in mandates (G24) | attractiveness of funds to investors (G23) |
| financial crisis (G01) | reliance on credit ratings (G24) |