Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13340
Authors: Alberto Martin; Vladimir Asriyan; Luc Laeven
Abstract: We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. In our model, entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources towards private consumption. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization and costly screening, which generates durable information about projects. In equilibrium, the collateralization-screening mix depends on the value of aggregate collateral. High collateral values raise investment and economic activity, but they also raise collateralization at the expense of screening. This has important dynamic implications. During credit booms driven by high collateral values (e.g. real estate booms), the economy accumulates physical capital but depletes information about investment projects. As a result, collateral-driven booms end in deep crises and slow recoveries: when booms end, investment is constrained both by the lack of collateral and by the lack of information on existing investment projects, which takes time to rebuild. We provide new empirical evidence using US firm-level data in support of the model’s main mechanism.
Keywords: credit booms; collateral; information production; crises; misallocation
JEL Codes: E32; E44; G01; D80
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| high collateral values (G32) | increased investment (E22) |
| high collateral values (G32) | crowd out screening efforts (I14) |
| crowd out screening efforts (I14) | information depletion (D83) |
| high collateral values (G32) | increased economic activity (F69) |
| information depletion (D83) | deep crises (H12) |
| information depletion (D83) | slow recoveries (E65) |
| duration of a firm's main lending relationship decreases (G21) | value of its real estate increases (R33) |