Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13280
Authors: Helios Herrera; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Joseph C. McMurray
Abstract: This paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyses voter participation in common interest proportional representation (PR) elections, comparing this with majority rule. Consistent with theoretical predictions, poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting, thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed. A dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under PR, so abstention is higher in PR in contrast with private interest environments, and welfare is lower. Deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which allows for voter mistakes.
Keywords: turnout; information aggregation; proportional representation; majority rule; laboratory experiment
JEL Codes: C92; D70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral system (PR) (D72) | Voter abstention (K16) |
| Poorly informed voters (D72) | Voter abstention in PR (K16) |
| Mistakes in PR (H12) | Voter caution (K16) |
| Voter mistakes (K16) | Turnout decisions (D79) |
| Partisanship (D72) | Voter turnout (K16) |
| Electoral system (Majority Rule) (D72) | Voter abstention (K16) |