Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13270
Authors: Natalia Fabra; Xueying Bian
Abstract: We build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses´ energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners` incentives to obtain and disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as has been widely documented - but also on the rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs. The theoretical predictions are empirically quantified in the context of the Spanish rental market.
Keywords: asymmetric information; energy efficiency; adoption rate; rental market
JEL Codes: L85; Q48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher disclosure rates (G28) | stronger incentives for compliance (H26) |
| energy efficiency of houses (Q41) | rental prices (R31) |
| unlabeled houses (Y91) | rent penalty (R33) |
| higher disclosure rates (G28) | lower rental prices for unlabeled houses (R31) |