Burning Money: Government Lending in a Credit Crunch

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13267

Authors: Gabriel Jiménez; José Luis Peydró; Rafael Repullo; Jesús Saurina

Abstract: We analyze a small, new credit facility of a Spanish state-owned-bank during the crisis, using its continuous credit scoring system, firm-level scores, and credit register data. Compared to privately-owned banks, the state-owned bank faces worse applicants, softens (tightens) its credit supply to unobserved (observable) riskier firms, and has much higher defaults. In a regression discontinuity design, the supply of public credit causes: large positive real effects to financially-constrained firms (whose relationship banks reduced substantially credit supply); crowding-in of new private-bank credit; and positive spillovers to other firms. Private returns of the credit facility are negative, while social returns are positive.

Keywords: real effects of public credit; credit scoring; credit crunch; crowding-in; adverse selection; state-owned banks

JEL Codes: E44; G01; G21; G28


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Public credit from state-owned bank (H81)likelihood of survival for financially constrained firms (G33)
Public lending (F34)employment growth (O49)
Public lending (F34)total assets (G19)
Public lending (F34)total sales (L81)
Public lending (F34)investment and productivity (O49)
Public lending (F34)likelihood of receiving subsequent private bank loans (G21)
Public lending (F34)default rates at state-owned bank (G21)

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