Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13260
Authors: Benny Moldovanu
Abstract: We study killer amendments under various informational regimes andpostulated voter behavior. In particular, the success chances of killeramendments are shown to differ across several well-known binary, sequentialvoting procedures. In light of this theory, we describe a remarkableinstance of a motion-proposing and agenda-setting strategy by the Naziparty, NSDAP, during the Weimar Republic. Their purpose was to killa motion of toleration of the new 1928 Government, and they were supportedby their fiercest enemies on the far left, the communist party. Thecombined killer strategy was bound to be successful, but it ultimatelyfailed because of another agenda-setting counter-move undertaken by theReichstag president.
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Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Standard amendment procedure (Y20) | Killer amendments cannot be successful (D72) |
| Sincere voting (K16) | Outcome remains in the Condorcet set (D79) |
| Successive voting procedure (D72) | Killer amendments can succeed (D72) |
| Incomplete information (D82) | Killer amendments can succeed (D72) |
| Procedural rules (K40) | Success of killer amendments (D72) |
| Timing of votes (D72) | Success of killer amendments (D72) |
| Agenda-setting (D72) | Success of killer amendments (D72) |