Multicandidate Political Competition and the Industrial Organization of Politics

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13121

Authors: Avner Seror; Thierry Verdier

Abstract: In this paper, we present a microfounded theory of multi-candidate political competition taking an "industrial organization" perspective of politics. The analytical framework is shown to be exible enough to address several applications on the topics of special interest politics, coalition formation in the legislature in proportional elections, and redistribution under alternative electoral rules.

Keywords: Probabilistic Voting Models; Frechet Distributions; Redistribution; Public Policy; Runoff; Plurality; Proportionality

JEL Codes: D71; D72; L11


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
type of electoral system (D72)political fragmentation (F12)
plurality rules (D72)political fragmentation (F12)
psychological effects of voting behavior (D91)candidate entry (L26)
voter responsiveness (D72)number of parties entering the election (D79)
media campaigns (M38)political fragmentation (F12)
electoral rules (K16)candidate entry (L26)
cost of party formation (D71)candidate entry (L26)

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