Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13053
Authors: Ruben Enikolopov; Andrew Beath; Fotini Christia
Abstract: Using data from a field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, we study how electoral accountability of local institutions affects the quality of governance. In villages with newly created elected councils, food aid distributed by local leaders is more likely to reach needy villagers. However, this effect is observed only if the council is mandated to be the entity responsible for managing the distribution. In the absence of such a mandate the presence of elected councils increases embezzlement without improving aid targeting. Thus, while elected councils can improvegovernance, unclear and overlapping mandates may increase rent-seeking and worsen governance outcomes.
Keywords: political institutions; field experiment; democratization; governance quality
JEL Codes: D7; O1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Creation of elected councils (D72) | Improvement in targeting of food aid (F35) |
| Mandated council management (H70) | Improvement in targeting of food aid (F35) |
| Presence of elected councils (without clear mandate) (H11) | Increased embezzlement (H26) |
| Presence of elected councils (without clear mandate) (H11) | Reduced inclusiveness (J15) |
| Mandating female participation in non-council villages (J16) | Increased embezzlement (H26) |
| Mandating female participation in non-council villages (J16) | No improvement in targeting or participation (I24) |