Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13020

Authors: Marcos Chamon; Julian Schumacher; Christoph Trebesch

Abstract: Governments often issue bonds in foreign jurisdictions, which can provide additional legal protection vis-à-vis domestic bonds. This paper studies the effect of this jurisdiction choice on bond prices. We test whether foreign-law bonds trade at a premium compared to domestic-law bonds. We use the euro area 2006-2013 as a unique testing ground, controlling for currency risk, liquidity risk, and term structure. Foreign-law bonds indeed carry significantly lower yields in distress periods, and this effect rises as the risk of a sovereign default increases. These results indicate that, in times of crisis, governments can borrow at lower rates under foreign law.

Keywords: sovereign debt; creditor rights; seniority; law and finance

JEL Codes: F34; G12; K22


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Legal jurisdiction (K41)Bond yield (G12)
Sovereign default risk (F34)Foreign-law premium (K39)
Credit default swap (CDS) implied risk-neutral default probability (G33)Foreign-law premium (K39)

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