Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12958
Authors: Caterina Calsamiglia; Chao Fu; Maia Gell
Abstract: We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) anddevelop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve thechoice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate thejoint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using adminis-trative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a changefrom BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfareby 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increaseaverage welfare by 460 euros.
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Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Boston mechanism (BM) (L64) | Household Welfare (I38) |
| Deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) (C78) | Household Welfare (I38) |
| Top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) (E32) | Household Welfare (I38) |