Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12927
Authors: Jeanne Hagenbach; Eduardo Perez-Richet
Abstract: We study a class of sender-receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.
Keywords: sender-receiver game; hard evidence; information disclosure; masquerade; relation skepticism; obvious dominance
JEL Codes: C72; C91; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| evidence disclosed by senders (L87) | performance of receivers (G14) |
| sender type (satisfied) (Y90) | strategy employed (full disclosure) (D82) |
| sender type (envious) (Y90) | use of vague messages (D84) |
| structure of the game (cyclic graph) (C73) | performance of senders (L87) |