Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1288
Authors: Mika Widgren
Abstract: The paper deals with aspects of national and supranational influence in the European Union. The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, it deals with the relationship between the Council and Commission by applying the standard measures of voting power of cooperative games. It then extends the voting game of 15 countries in the Council of Ministers to a voting game of 16 actors: the Commission plus 15 member states. This is done by taking into account that a Commission proposal is always required for the Council to take a decision. Second, the paper analyses the impact of alternative rules and compares the problems they have with the current rule. Third, the paper investigates how these problems could be avoided.
Keywords: European Union; Cooperative Game Theory; Voting Power
JEL Codes: C71; D70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| current decision-making system (D70) | Commission's power (G18) |
| reducing majority requirements (D79) | Commission's independence (G18) |
| simple majority rule (D79) | Commission's decision-making power (D70) |
| simple majority rule (D79) | concentration of power (D30) |
| concentration of power (D30) | impact on national preferences (F69) |