Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12790
Authors: Alessandra Casarico; Giovanni Facchini; Tommaso Frattini
Abstract: We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representativein supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy isin place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted arethe occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the smaller isthe fiscal leakage to undocumented immigrants via the welfare state. Empiricalevidence based on the voting behaviour of U.S. Congressmen on the ImmigrationReform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions ofour theoretical model.
Keywords: migration; policy; amnesties; roll call votes
JEL Codes: F22; O51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Labor market mismatch (J68) | Support for IRCA (K37) |
| Local fiscal leakage (H79) | Support for IRCA (K37) |
| Median family income (D31) | Support for IRCA (K37) |