Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1272
Authors: Jan I. Haaland; Ian Wooton
Abstract: Anti-dumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. We investigate the impact of anti-dumping rules on firms' production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Anti-dumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. We therefore focus on locational choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through anti-dumping legislation. Our analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.
Keywords: Antidumping; Market Integration; Location
JEL Codes: F12; F13; L11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Antidumping rules (F18) | Increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (F21) |
| Antidumping rules (F18) | Heightened Domestic Competition (L19) |
| Increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (F21) | Increased Competition in the Domestic Market (L19) |
| Local Production by Foreign Firms (F23) | Enhanced Consumer Welfare (D69) |
| Antidumping rules (F18) | Relocation of Foreign Firms' Production (F23) |
| Retaliatory Antidumping Measures (F18) | Harm to Domestic Consumers and Firms (F61) |
| Retaliatory Antidumping Measures (F18) | Decrease in Competition (L13) |
| Decrease in Competition (L13) | Higher Prices (D49) |