Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12575
Authors: Dana Foarta; Jessica Leight; Rohini Pande; Laura Ralston
Abstract: Community targeting of vote payments — defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections — is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion.
Keywords: vote buying; politician accountability; social preferences
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| community targeting of vote payments (D72) | politicians' rent-seeking behavior (D72) |
| community targeting of vote payments (D72) | voters' tolerance of politician rent-seeking (D72) |
| vote payments (D72) | voters' willingness to punish politicians for expropriation (D72) |
| vote payments (D72) | subjects' reelection thresholds (D72) |
| non-recipients of vote payments (D72) | decrease in reelection thresholds (K16) |
| community targeting of vote payments (D72) | voter accountability (K16) |