Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12557
Authors: Juan Jose Ganuza Fernandez; Gerard Llobet
Abstract: This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about the future profitability of a project. Uniformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because they are profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening them out according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-value projects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firms can bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract, which fosters the acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of the concession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out some projects.
Keywords: concession contracts; information acquisition; flexible-term concessions
JEL Codes: D82; D86; H21; L51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Concession contracts (L14) | Information acquisition (D83) |
| Information acquisition (D83) | Emergence of white elephants (F54) |
| Concession contracts (L14) | Emergence of white elephants (F54) |
| Limited liability (K13) | Information acquisition (D83) |
| Limited liability (K13) | Emergence of white elephants (F54) |
| Concession contracts (L14) | Uninformed contractors undertaking projects (L74) |
| Uninformed contractors undertaking projects (L74) | Emergence of white elephants (F54) |