Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12552
Authors: Samuel Bazzi; Matthew Gudgeon
Abstract: This paper argues that redrawing subnational political boundaries can transform ethnic divisions. We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how the effects of ethnic diversity on conflict depend on the political units within which groups are organized. Redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict, but these gains are undone or even reversed when the new borders introduce greater polarization. These adverse effects of polarization are further amplified around majoritarian elections, consistent with strong incentives to capture new local governments in settings with ethnic favoritism.Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redistricting in diverse countries.
Keywords: conflict; decentralization; ethnic divisions; polarization; political boundaries
JEL Codes: D72; D74; H41; H77; O13; Q34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| redistricting along ethnic lines (R23) | reduce conflict (D74) |
| new borders foster increased polarization (F55) | undo gains from redistricting (D72) |
| one standard deviation increase in polarization (C46) | significant 68 percentage point increase in social conflict (D74) |
| majoritarian elections (D72) | amplify adverse effects of polarization (D72) |
| reconfiguration of political boundaries (F55) | alter group interactions and competition for resources (D74) |
| changes in political boundaries (F55) | lead to fresh cycles of conflict (D74) |
| closely contested mayoral elections in newly created districts (K16) | lead to fresh cycles of conflict (D74) |