Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12507
Authors: Minke Remmerswaal; Jan Boone; Michiel Bijlsma; Rudy Douven
Abstract: Since 2006, the Dutch population has faced two different cost-sharing schemes in health insurance for curative care: a mandatory rebate of 255 euros in 2006 and 2007, and since 2008 a mandatory deductible. Using administrative data for the entire Dutch population, we compare the effect of both cost-sharing schemes on healthcare consumption between 2006 and 2013. We use a regression discontinuity design which exploits the fact that persons younger than eighteen years old neither face a rebate nor a deductible. Our fixed effect estimate shows that for individuals around the age of eighteen, a one euro increase of the deductible reduces healthcare expenditures 18 eurocents more than a euro increase of the rebate. These results demonstrate that differences in the design of a cost-sharing scheme can lead to substantial different effects on total healthcare expenditure.
Keywords: deductible; rebate; cost-sharing; healthcare consumption; regression discontinuity design; panel data
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| deductible (G22) | rebate (L42) |
| cost-sharing mechanisms (D16) | healthcare expenditures (H51) |
| deductible (G22) | healthcare expenditures (H51) |
| rebate (L42) | healthcare expenditures (H51) |