Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12493
Authors: Benoit S. Y. Crutzen; Sabine Flamand; Nicolas Sahuguet
Abstract: We study a contest between teams that compete for multiple indivisible prizes. Team output is a CES function of all the team members' efforts. We use a generalized Tullock contest success function to allocate prizes between teams. We study how different intra-team prize allocation rules impact team output. We consider an egalitarian rule that gives all members the same chance of receiving a prize, and a list rule that sets ex-ante the order in which members receive a prize. The convexity of the cost of effort function and the complementarity of individual efforts determine which rule maximizes team output and success. Our results speak to many real world situations, such as elections, contests for the allocation of local public goods and the internal organization of firms.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Egalitarian rule (D63) | higher team output (D29) |
| List rule (Y60) | higher team output (D29) |
| Complementarity of individual efforts (D10) | allocation rule effectiveness (D61) |
| Convexity of cost of effort function (D24) | allocation rule effectiveness (D61) |
| Egalitarian rule (D63) | incentives (M52) |
| List rule (Y60) | incentives (M52) |
| Allocation rules (D45) | team performance (M54) |