Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12492
Authors: Olivier Compte; Philippe Jehiel
Abstract: We develop a simple model that rationalizes why less stringent majority rules are preferable to unanimity in large committees. Proposals arerandomly generated and the running proposal is adopted whenever it is approved by a sufficiently large share of voters. Unanimity induces excessive delays while too weak majority requirements induce the adoption of suboptimal proposals. The optimal majority rule balances these two inefficiencies: it requires the approval by a share equal to the probability (assumed to be constant across proposals) that a given member gets more than the average welfare associated with the running proposal. Various extensions are considered.
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Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Unanimity (D70) | Excessive Delays (L91) |
| Weak Majority (D79) | Suboptimal Proposals (D79) |
| Optimal Majority Rule (D79) | Balance of Delays and Proposal Quality (L15) |