Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1212
Authors: Morten O. Ravn; Jan Rose Sørensen
Abstract: In this paper we consider the effects of minimum wage legislation in an overlapping generations model. In our model there is an intergenerational externality in the accumulation of human capital since the production of human capital of every new generation depends positively on the average human capital stock of the preceding generation. This externality means that the competitive equilibrium allocation is sub-optimal, and every generation accumulates too little human capital. We show that in the case of identical agents, a minimum wage above the market wage can increase human capital accumulation and welfare. Furthermore, the first-best allocation can be attained through the implementation of a minimum wage. We introduce a cross-agent heterogeneity such that agents differ in their ability to produce human capital. In this case a (binding) minimum wage may produce unemployment, and it may increase or decrease human capital accumulation.
Keywords: overlapping generations; human capital accumulation; intergenerational externality; minimum wages
JEL Codes: D90; E24
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Minimum wage above market wage (J38) | Increased human capital accumulation (J24) |
| Minimum wage above market wage (J38) | Improved welfare (I39) |
| Binding minimum wage (J38) | Unemployment (J64) |
| Binding minimum wage (J38) | Mixed effects on human capital accumulation (J24) |
| Low minimum wage (J38) | Increased schooling efforts by less able agents (J24) |
| High minimum wage (J38) | Decreased human capital accumulation (J24) |
| Minimum wage (J38) | Spike in wage distribution at minimum wage level (J31) |
| Minimum wage (J38) | Negative effect on school enrolment rates (I21) |