Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP12065
Authors: Thomas Gehrig; Rune Stenbacka
Abstract: We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. Total screening in a duopolistic journal industry exceeds that of a monopoly. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. Interestingly, in the sequential screening model established journal rankings tend to reduce screening incentives. The screening technology determines whether the high-ranked or low-ranked journal have stronger screening incentives, which has implications for the long-run stability of established rankings.
Keywords: simultaneous versus sequential screening; information acquisition; assessment of research quality; competition between journals
JEL Codes: L10; L13; D80
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Journal competition (Y90) | Screening intensity (C22) |
| Exclusivity requirements for submissions (L17) | Screening intensity (C22) |
| Established journal rankings (A14) | Screening incentives (M52) |
| Screening technology (L63) | Investment decisions of journals (G11) |
| Submission system (Y70) | Average quality of published research (L15) |
| Screening costs (J32) | Social preference for sequential submission system (D71) |