Cartels, Contracts and Centralization: The Transition to Futures Trading for Primary Commodities

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1193

Authors: Jonathan Haskel; Andrew Powell

Abstract: Trading in futures markets has grown substantially for many commodities. At the same time the power of many dominant producers has weakened and core prices have tended to fall towards those on the fringe. Existing cartel/fringe models fail to explain the difference between core and fringe prices and have no role for the development of futures trading. We present a cartel/fringe model that incorporates search and contracting. The model predicts that cartel prices exceed those on the fringe; that the cartel/fringe price differential narrows as futures trading increases; and that a move to contracting lowers market prices.

Keywords: cartelfringe models; search; contracting; futures markets

JEL Codes: L13; L14; L61; L71


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
cartel prices (P22)fringe prices (D49)
futures trading (G13)cartel-fringe price differential (D43)
contracting (M55)market prices (P22)

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