Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP11463
Authors: Helios Herrera; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Joseph C. McMurray
Abstract: This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. The marginal voter's curse presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter's curse. Moreover, marginal motivations are shown to dominate pivotal motivations in large elections. Model predictions are confirmed in a laboratory experiment and applied in a comparative analysis of electoral rules.
Keywords: turnout; information aggregation; underdog effect; experiment
JEL Codes: C72; C92; D70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| marginal voters curse (D79) | voter turnout (K16) |
| marginal motivations (D91) | pivotal motivations (D91) |
| vote for losing party (D72) | vote share (D72) |
| voter uncertainty (D80) | abstention (Y60) |
| marginal voters curse (D79) | lower turnout rates (K16) |