Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP11281
Authors: Giovanni Facchini; Cecilia Testa
Abstract: During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to `hard time constraints', and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers' bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.
Keywords: bicameralism; corruption; lobbying
JEL Codes: D72; D73
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Bicameralism (D72) | Decline in lawmakers' bargaining power (D72) |
| Decline in lawmakers' bargaining power (D72) | Undermines accountability to voters (D72) |
| Bicameralism (D72) | Weaker negotiating position against lobbyists (D72) |
| Time constraints (C41) | Weaker negotiating position against lobbyists (D72) |
| Time constraints (C41) | Easier lobby capture (C71) |
| Bicameralism (D72) | Fragmentation of decision-making (D91) |
| Fragmentation of decision-making (D91) | Easier for lobbyists to influence legislation (D72) |
| Bicameralism (D72) | Undermines electoral accountability (D72) |