Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP11126
Authors: Quocanh Do; Kieutrang Nguyen; Anh Tran
Abstract: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
Keywords: favoritism; patronage; authoritarian regime; political connection; hometown infrastructure; distributive politics
JEL Codes: O12; D72; H72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| promotions of native officials (M51) | improvements in infrastructure in their hometowns (O18) |
| one-position increase in power capital (D29) | increase in new categories of infrastructure (H76) |
| promotions of native officials (M51) | incidence rate of new infrastructure categories (H76) |