Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP11087
Authors: Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frédéric Malherbe
Abstract: We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.
Keywords: constructive abstention; framing; information aggregation; laboratory experiments; unanimity rule; veto power
JEL Codes: C92; D70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| type of voting rule (D72) | likelihood of correct group decisions (D70) |
| majority rule with veto power (D72) | better information aggregation (D83) |
| majority rule with veto power (D72) | reduction in type II errors (C52) |
| veto power (D72) | fewer mistakes (C52) |
| framing of voting rules (K16) | decision outcomes (D70) |
| veto power (D72) | better alignment with theoretical predictions (C51) |