Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10912
Authors: Emeric Henry; Charles Louissidois
Abstract: Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.
Keywords: image concern; information aggregation; public good; voting
JEL Codes: D71; D72; H41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Imposition of sanctions (F51) | Increased attendance at meetings (C92) |
| Increased attendance at meetings (C92) | Overall contributions (D64) |
| Voting behavior (D72) | Contribution decisions (D70) |
| Image concerns (Y90) | Voting behavior (D72) |
| Image concerns (Y90) | Contribution levels (D64) |
| Requirement of a supermajority (D72) | Lower voting cutoff (K16) |
| Visibility of contributions (D64) | Distinct equilibria (D59) |
| Larger groups (C92) | Decreased probability of being pivotal (D79) |
| Decreased probability of being pivotal (D79) | Tendency for sanctions to be adopted (F51) |