Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10888
Authors: Filip Matjka; Guido Tabellini
Abstract: This paper studies how voters optimally allocate costly attention in a model of probabilistic voting. The equilibrium solves a modified social planning problem that reflects voters? choice of attention. Voters are more attentive when their stakes are higher, when their cost of information is lower and prior uncertainty is higher. We explore the implications of this in a variety of applications. In equilibrium, extremist voters are more influential and public goods are under-provided. The analysis also yields predictions about the equilibrium pattern of information, and about policy divergence by two opportunistic candidates. Endogenous attention can lead to multiple equilibria, explaining how poor voters in developing countries can be politically empowered by welfare programs.
Keywords: behavioural political economy; electoral competition; rational inattention; salience
JEL Codes: H00; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Welfare programs (I38) | Political engagement among the poor (I32) |
| Political engagement among the poor (I32) | Political influence (D72) |
| Higher stakes (C73) | Increased voter attention (K16) |
| Increased voter attention (K16) | Policy outcomes (D78) |
| Voter attention allocation (D72) | Candidates' policy choices (D79) |
| Candidates' policy choices (D79) | Systematic policy distortions (H31) |
| Extreme preferences (D11) | Influence in the political process (D72) |
| Attention allocation (D91) | Policy outcomes favoring extreme preferences (D72) |
| Increased political engagement (D72) | Pro-poor policies (H53) |
| Pro-poor policies (H53) | Cycle of empowerment (I24) |