Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10769
Authors: Ruben Durante; Emilio Gutierrez
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between inter-jurisdictional cooperation and law enforcement in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design in close municipal elections, we study how improved opportunities for cooperation in crime prevention among neighboring municipalities - proxied by the degree of political alignment between mayors - may result in lower rates of violent crime. We find that municipalities in which the party in power in the majority of neighboring jurisdictions barely won experience significantly lower homicide rates during the mayor's mandate than those in which it barely lost. This effect is sizeable and robust, is increasing in the share of neighboring municipalities governed by the same party, is independent of which party governs the neighboring municipalities, and does not appear to be driven by improved cooperation with either federal or state authorities.
Keywords: Crime; Interjurisdictional Cooperation; Law Enforcement; Mexico; Political Parties
JEL Codes: H11; H41; H7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Political alignment (D72) | Homicide rates (J11) |
| Winning party's governance of neighboring jurisdictions (D72) | Political alignment (D72) |
| Political alignment (D72) | Horizontal cooperation among local police forces (F55) |
| Horizontal cooperation among local police forces (F55) | Homicide rates (J11) |
| Winning party's governance of neighboring jurisdictions (D72) | Homicide rates (J11) |